Too long to be a reply
I was going to make a reply to the posters in the comments section for my last blog entry regarding what I view as the astonishing treatment of Mr. Raed Jarrar by an airline representative and federal agents. I wrote out my reply to the valid points they made concerning this entry, but felt the entry itself is large enough to warrant its own place as a post, rather than as a series of several serial replies.
The comments left regarding my previous post are both valid and common viewpoints regarding the situation I previously described regarding Mr. Jarrar and the JetBlue airline. The only problem is that once you go down the road their reasoning sets before you, there is no non-arbitrary place to bring that reasoning to a halt. I’ll agree that a company has a right to see that the people inside its facilities (be it an airplane, a restaurant, a movie theater, or a department store) are treated courteously and given no particular reasons to walk away dissatisfied from an experience with the organization. However, society has to place some limits on the exercise of the company’s power to do so in order to keep a check on the use of that corporate instinct to engage in discrimination.
Let’s alter the facts of the instant case just a little bit to see how far that line of reasoning can take us. Let us suppose that you are the airline company and Mr. Jarrar is scheduled to be on your flight leaving J.F.K. airport. Mr. Jarrar did not wear his anti-Iraq war shirt, but instead is wearing simply a white, button-up Oxford shirt and jeans. Let us also suppose that people on the plane, seeing that he looks Arabic, complain to the company regarding their feeling of safety on the flight and demand that he be removed from the plane.
Should the company again seek to ease the fears and prejudices of its patrons by making Mr. Jarrar leave the plane? Should they just cancel his ticket? Should they rearrange his seat so as to place him at the opposite end of the plane from the people who are complaining about him based on a stereotyped view they hold regarding the tendency of his race to engage in violent acts? Or, in fact, is it wrong for them to make him do anything differently than any other patrons so long as he is not endangering himself or other patrons in the normal, everyday use of the facilities of the airline?
What if Mr. Jarrar (again, not wearing his anti-Iraq war t-shirt) chose to fly with three other individuals of Arabic descent. Should the airline split them up onto different flights to make people less nervous about a group of Arabs traveling together on a plane? Should they be treated differently simply on the basis of their racial background?
If you think this scenario is unlikely, you’d be wrong. Earlier this month, a Canadian radiology medical student of Arabic descent, and an East Indian colleague, were forced off of a plane in Denver after another passenger complained that he thought they were terrorists after witnessing the Canadian medical student discreetly saying his evening prayers (as his religion commands).
Earlier this year, a flight leaving from Los Angeles had an incident where a father and son of the Islamic faith dressed in their traditional South Asian tunic and skullcaps were forced off of an airplane because their presence made a flight attendant uncomfortable.
These are not isolated examples. A single ‘google’ search netted me a few dozen examples from this year alone, and that was without me taking the time to go to the second page of results. Acts like what happened to Mr. Jarrar reflect a widespread, and growing, wave of animus toward anything having to do with the Middle Eastern peoples.
Racial and ethnic animus coming from intolerant and bigoted people is not an excuse for companies to be engaged in discrimination. It is precisely because companies were exercising their right to serve customers based on racial animus that pushed some of the best reforms of the civil rights legislation from the 1950’s.
If Mr. Jarrar posed a threat to the flight, this wouldn’t be an issue. In the end, though, Mr. Jarrar had passed through security several times, been searched, and had his identification checked several times. To have the airline threaten that he couldn’t take a flight because he wore a t-shirt with a political slogan written in a Middle Eastern script is not based on security concerns stemming from Mr. Jarrar. It can only stem from the animus of other passengers or the airline itself regarding one of the world’s most widely spoken languages as a symbol of a perceived threat based upon a prejudice based upon an inaccurate stereotype based upon a single terrorist attack. It should be pretty clear that if that were a legitimate reason to keep someone off of a plane, then why not keep every white man off of a plane on the assumption that he might be a Klansman who will pick a fight with black passengers?
Such an analysis can be carried to any number of other scenarios. What if an individual books a ticket (unknowingly) on a plane that is taking the full membership of an atheist organization to a national conference in D.C., but the person wants to read silently from their bible during the trip? Ought the atheists on board to have a valid complaint to the airline (to have the Christian treated differently) simply because they do not like the fact that he is reading from his bible?
I think that there is a strong case to be made that, unless the individual is doing something dangerous or obscene, a company is engaged in an active campaign of discrimination to differentiate among its patrons in this way.
What is worse is that federal officials seem to have gotten involved in such a discrimination. This is problematic for severa large reasons, each of which I feel individually makes the case that the government should have acted differently in this case.
First, it should be troubling to any American to have a wide array of the U.S. population live under a separate legal system from the rest of us simply on the basis of their differing racial or religious backgrounds. Such allowances have universally led to abuses like the internment camps for Japanese-Americans during World War II, laws governing education or literacy requirements for voting in the South following the passage of the Civil War amendments to the Constitution, and laws favoring white business owners at the expense of their Chinese-immigrant competitors in California in the operation of commercial laundries. This very debate still rages over the practice of racial profiling for African-Americans in most metropolitan areas. Suggesting that it was wrong of Mr. Jarrar to wear his political shirt is analogous to suggesting that an African-American is at fault for his discriminatory stop simply because he chose to drive in a Lexus automobile. This very idea was rejected when the framers of the Constitution created a clause forbidding bills of attainder in the United States. In Britain, if someone in your family committed a serious enough crime, not only their property, freedom, and life were on the line, but yours as well. Their evil had 'attainted' you by association, and the crown could seize your land, lock you up, or hang you. The United States explicitly rejected the idea of guilt by association, and rejected the idea so thoroughly as to enshrine it in our most cherished legal document.
Simply put, having a separate legal framework for people based solely on arbitrary characteristics or association has never been a tool of freedom. It has only ever been used to create a favored class and a disfavored class, or to maintain such an already created division. We have seen this time and time again in American and foreign jurisdictions, and it seems abundantly clear that a similar set of consequences is at work here. It is not the type of thing our government should be involved in, and it should raise the hackles of any freedom-loving and egalitarian American.
Secondly, our Constitution gives all Americans the right to free speech (which has been interpreted to include written articles and symbolic artwork) which should encompass Mr. Jarrar’s t-shirt. The content of speech is only permissibly regulated by government action if the content itself is dangerous (the old ‘yelling-fire-in-a-crowded-theater’ example) or obscene. Mr. Jarrar’s shirt fit within neither of these categories. Furthermore, Mr. Jarrar’s t-shirt falls directly within the ambit of the most heavily protected form of speech – a form of speech which many Constitutional scholars believe was the impetus for the protections of the First Amendment – in our Constitution: political speech. Your right to criticize the government or its policies is the most inviolable form of expression available to an American citizen, and to lightly toss this aside is tantamount to declaring war on the Constitution and the principles which underlie it.
A third reason why having the federal government get involved in this situation in the manner in which they apparently did, is that it passes the imprimatur of the federal government over the actions of the company. Companies in the future will feel justified in discriminating among their customers based on the expressed religious, racial, or ethnic prejudices of the majority of their customers. While a dangerous path for a corporate entity to take on its own, with the federal government’s ‘go-ahead’ stamped on the policy, the slope becomes doubly as slippery.
The end analysis must be that companies cannot rightly give ground to the animosity and bigotry of their customers in a race to make money. Doing so violates their moral imperative, promotes or exacerbates animosity between favored and disfavored classes, and violates the principles enshrined in the civil rights legislation of the 1950’s. Having our government help a company do this violates principles of equality, egalitarianism, justice, freedom, and the legal frameworks which support these principles, while simultaneously turning our backs on our Constitution’s requirements and the greatest advances in racial equality made during the 20th century.
The comments left regarding my previous post are both valid and common viewpoints regarding the situation I previously described regarding Mr. Jarrar and the JetBlue airline. The only problem is that once you go down the road their reasoning sets before you, there is no non-arbitrary place to bring that reasoning to a halt. I’ll agree that a company has a right to see that the people inside its facilities (be it an airplane, a restaurant, a movie theater, or a department store) are treated courteously and given no particular reasons to walk away dissatisfied from an experience with the organization. However, society has to place some limits on the exercise of the company’s power to do so in order to keep a check on the use of that corporate instinct to engage in discrimination.
Let’s alter the facts of the instant case just a little bit to see how far that line of reasoning can take us. Let us suppose that you are the airline company and Mr. Jarrar is scheduled to be on your flight leaving J.F.K. airport. Mr. Jarrar did not wear his anti-Iraq war shirt, but instead is wearing simply a white, button-up Oxford shirt and jeans. Let us also suppose that people on the plane, seeing that he looks Arabic, complain to the company regarding their feeling of safety on the flight and demand that he be removed from the plane.
Should the company again seek to ease the fears and prejudices of its patrons by making Mr. Jarrar leave the plane? Should they just cancel his ticket? Should they rearrange his seat so as to place him at the opposite end of the plane from the people who are complaining about him based on a stereotyped view they hold regarding the tendency of his race to engage in violent acts? Or, in fact, is it wrong for them to make him do anything differently than any other patrons so long as he is not endangering himself or other patrons in the normal, everyday use of the facilities of the airline?
What if Mr. Jarrar (again, not wearing his anti-Iraq war t-shirt) chose to fly with three other individuals of Arabic descent. Should the airline split them up onto different flights to make people less nervous about a group of Arabs traveling together on a plane? Should they be treated differently simply on the basis of their racial background?
If you think this scenario is unlikely, you’d be wrong. Earlier this month, a Canadian radiology medical student of Arabic descent, and an East Indian colleague, were forced off of a plane in Denver after another passenger complained that he thought they were terrorists after witnessing the Canadian medical student discreetly saying his evening prayers (as his religion commands).
Earlier this year, a flight leaving from Los Angeles had an incident where a father and son of the Islamic faith dressed in their traditional South Asian tunic and skullcaps were forced off of an airplane because their presence made a flight attendant uncomfortable.
These are not isolated examples. A single ‘google’ search netted me a few dozen examples from this year alone, and that was without me taking the time to go to the second page of results. Acts like what happened to Mr. Jarrar reflect a widespread, and growing, wave of animus toward anything having to do with the Middle Eastern peoples.
Racial and ethnic animus coming from intolerant and bigoted people is not an excuse for companies to be engaged in discrimination. It is precisely because companies were exercising their right to serve customers based on racial animus that pushed some of the best reforms of the civil rights legislation from the 1950’s.
If Mr. Jarrar posed a threat to the flight, this wouldn’t be an issue. In the end, though, Mr. Jarrar had passed through security several times, been searched, and had his identification checked several times. To have the airline threaten that he couldn’t take a flight because he wore a t-shirt with a political slogan written in a Middle Eastern script is not based on security concerns stemming from Mr. Jarrar. It can only stem from the animus of other passengers or the airline itself regarding one of the world’s most widely spoken languages as a symbol of a perceived threat based upon a prejudice based upon an inaccurate stereotype based upon a single terrorist attack. It should be pretty clear that if that were a legitimate reason to keep someone off of a plane, then why not keep every white man off of a plane on the assumption that he might be a Klansman who will pick a fight with black passengers?
Such an analysis can be carried to any number of other scenarios. What if an individual books a ticket (unknowingly) on a plane that is taking the full membership of an atheist organization to a national conference in D.C., but the person wants to read silently from their bible during the trip? Ought the atheists on board to have a valid complaint to the airline (to have the Christian treated differently) simply because they do not like the fact that he is reading from his bible?
I think that there is a strong case to be made that, unless the individual is doing something dangerous or obscene, a company is engaged in an active campaign of discrimination to differentiate among its patrons in this way.
What is worse is that federal officials seem to have gotten involved in such a discrimination. This is problematic for severa large reasons, each of which I feel individually makes the case that the government should have acted differently in this case.
First, it should be troubling to any American to have a wide array of the U.S. population live under a separate legal system from the rest of us simply on the basis of their differing racial or religious backgrounds. Such allowances have universally led to abuses like the internment camps for Japanese-Americans during World War II, laws governing education or literacy requirements for voting in the South following the passage of the Civil War amendments to the Constitution, and laws favoring white business owners at the expense of their Chinese-immigrant competitors in California in the operation of commercial laundries. This very debate still rages over the practice of racial profiling for African-Americans in most metropolitan areas. Suggesting that it was wrong of Mr. Jarrar to wear his political shirt is analogous to suggesting that an African-American is at fault for his discriminatory stop simply because he chose to drive in a Lexus automobile. This very idea was rejected when the framers of the Constitution created a clause forbidding bills of attainder in the United States. In Britain, if someone in your family committed a serious enough crime, not only their property, freedom, and life were on the line, but yours as well. Their evil had 'attainted' you by association, and the crown could seize your land, lock you up, or hang you. The United States explicitly rejected the idea of guilt by association, and rejected the idea so thoroughly as to enshrine it in our most cherished legal document.
Simply put, having a separate legal framework for people based solely on arbitrary characteristics or association has never been a tool of freedom. It has only ever been used to create a favored class and a disfavored class, or to maintain such an already created division. We have seen this time and time again in American and foreign jurisdictions, and it seems abundantly clear that a similar set of consequences is at work here. It is not the type of thing our government should be involved in, and it should raise the hackles of any freedom-loving and egalitarian American.
Secondly, our Constitution gives all Americans the right to free speech (which has been interpreted to include written articles and symbolic artwork) which should encompass Mr. Jarrar’s t-shirt. The content of speech is only permissibly regulated by government action if the content itself is dangerous (the old ‘yelling-fire-in-a-crowded-theater’ example) or obscene. Mr. Jarrar’s shirt fit within neither of these categories. Furthermore, Mr. Jarrar’s t-shirt falls directly within the ambit of the most heavily protected form of speech – a form of speech which many Constitutional scholars believe was the impetus for the protections of the First Amendment – in our Constitution: political speech. Your right to criticize the government or its policies is the most inviolable form of expression available to an American citizen, and to lightly toss this aside is tantamount to declaring war on the Constitution and the principles which underlie it.
A third reason why having the federal government get involved in this situation in the manner in which they apparently did, is that it passes the imprimatur of the federal government over the actions of the company. Companies in the future will feel justified in discriminating among their customers based on the expressed religious, racial, or ethnic prejudices of the majority of their customers. While a dangerous path for a corporate entity to take on its own, with the federal government’s ‘go-ahead’ stamped on the policy, the slope becomes doubly as slippery.
The end analysis must be that companies cannot rightly give ground to the animosity and bigotry of their customers in a race to make money. Doing so violates their moral imperative, promotes or exacerbates animosity between favored and disfavored classes, and violates the principles enshrined in the civil rights legislation of the 1950’s. Having our government help a company do this violates principles of equality, egalitarianism, justice, freedom, and the legal frameworks which support these principles, while simultaneously turning our backs on our Constitution’s requirements and the greatest advances in racial equality made during the 20th century.